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AN INTRODUCTION TO SPATIAL ELECTION THEORY 
A History of Spatial Voting Theory 
The earliest roots of spatial voting theory can be found in Harold 
Hotelling's 1929 paper "Stability in Competition". The paper was 
primarily concerned with an analysis of the spatial equilibrium 
condition for two firms in competition. Hotelling's startling 
conclusion was that these two producers, choosing first their location 
and then their price, would choose to locate right next to each other. It 
was assumed that the consumers were uniformly distributed, and that 
they paid the cost of transportation so that each consumer would buy 
from the least-cost producer, taking account of both the base price and 
the transportation cost of the good. The equilibrium location for both 
firms under these conditions, he argued, must be located at the center 
of the consumer population; the location of the median consumer. 
The conclusion Hotelling reached was disturbing, since it is clear 
that the optimal location for the two firms, the location where the 
firms will produce and distribute at the minimum cost, would be at the 
quartile points (that is, one-quarter of the interval length from each 
end of the interval). Hotelling's conclusion was that the equilibrium 
location for the two firms would be suboptimal. 
In his concluding remarks, Hotelling claimed that this tendency 
for competitors to become identical might be more generally 
applicable. Of particular interest was his suggestion that this same 
centralizing tendency might be found in political programs. He 
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concluded that political parties will tend to offer essentially identical 
platforms rather than offering clear and distinct alternatives. The 
latter, Hotelling thought, would be preferable. 
Hotelling's argument as applied to the situation of competing 
firms was later shown to be fallacious (d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz, 
Thisse 1 979). The flaw in his argument was that, when firms are 
choosing the price of their product, if the firms are sufficiently close 
to one another, the best strategy by one firm is to undercut the price 
charged by the other firm at that firm's location, and hence undercut 
the price for the entire market area beyond it. Regardless of the 
positions chosen by the two firms, there will be no pure strategy 
equilibrium in prices - there is no profit maximizing pricing strategy 
for either firm which remains unchanged regardless of the pricing 
strategy of the other firm. While this counterargument can be applied 
to all market situations where a pricing mechanism exists, it does not 
apply to the analogous equilibrium in the case of differentiated 
political parties, where no equivalent to the pricing mechanism exists. 
Hotelling's paper spurred extensive research into the nature of 
spatial competition , although initially only Smithies (1941) examined 
the political implications of Hotelling's work. Smithies introduced the 
economic concept of elasticity into the analysis of voting behavior. 
The political interpretation of elasticity in a two-party campaign was 
the possibility that political extremists might abstain from voting as 
the preferred political party moved closer to the median voter in an 
attempt to capture moderate voters. 
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The breakthrough work on a spatial theory of voting was done by 
Black (1948 a, b). Black showed that, under the same assumption made 
by Hotelling and Smithies that the alternative political positions can 
be located on a single vector, and if preferences for each voter can be 
represented as a quasi-concave utility function, then the median most 
preferred point will have a majority against any other. Further, a 
pairwise majority vote among the alternatives will actually produce a 
complete order. 
The early spatial models, with their heavy reliance on the strong 
assumptions of single-peaked utility curves and of one-dimensional 
voter space suggests that a general impossibility theorem would exist 
should either of these two assumptions be dropped. These problems 
were highlighted by Black and Newing ( 1951 ), who showed that if the 
political space were represented in two dimensions rather than one, 
even the quasiconcavity assumption is insufficient to guarantee the 
existence of a Condorcet majority, let alone an ordering. 
Since these early explorations of spatial voting theory, there has 
been an explosion of research into spatial voting theory; so much 
research has been conducted in the field, addressing such a wide range 
of issues, that it can be divided into subfields. The most common 
distinction made is between spatial theory of committees and spatial 
theory of elections. The spatial theory model laid out by Black made no 
distinctions between the problems of elections and of committees, but 
subsequent research has raised separate and distinct issues for the 
two subfields. In the spatial theory of committees, the voters, each of 
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whom are mapped as a point in voter space, are the key actors to 
determining the policy or policies which will be enacted. In the spatial 
theory of elections, the candidates and their location in voter space are 
the key actors, with the voters paying a more fixed role. There are 
strong similarities between the two subfields, but translation of the 
results of committee theory to election theory or vice-versa is not 
always possible or desirable. 
Black viewed what would become the spatial theory of elections 
as nothing but a special case of the spatial theory of committees, 
where elected officials were simply modeled as a bundle of policy 
positions, which could be represented as a point in voter space. Voters 
were assumed to then vote strictly according to their preferences over 
the policy alternatives offered by the candidates; the result of Black's 
model of elections is essentially identical to the results he obtained 
for a committee voting on a set of policy alternatives. 
The first to lay out a spatial theory to be applied specifically to 
elections was Downs (1957) with a thorough mathematical foundation 
for election theory laid out by Davis and Hinich (1966). The election 
theory initiated in this work focused on the election scenario of a large 
electorate with no incentive to vote strategically1 . Election theory 
through the 1 960's and 1 970's focused on generalizing the assumptions 
of the model, but generally retained the characteristics set forth by 
1 Strategic voting involves a voter not revealing his/her true preference 
on the issue, in order to or change the behavior voting outcome. 
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Downs, Davis, and Hinich of a nonstrategic electorate and strategic 
candidates. 
Fahrquarson (1969) laid out much of the groundwork for modern 
committee theory based on the concept of sophisticated voting, and 
relied on an extensive use of game theory to provide a means of 
explaining the true strategic behavior inherent with the small number 
of voters usually examined in committee theory. 
The most complete analysis of the state of spatial election 
theory from this period is from Riker and Ordeshook ( 1 9 73), who list a 
wide range of assumptions regarding the behavior of both candidates 
and the electorate, and examine which of the various combinations of 
assumptions will result in a pure strategy equilibrium for the 
cand idates. Riker and Ordeshook allowed voters to have differently 
shaped utility curves, and may abstain from voting through either 
alienation or indifference. The candidates basic goal of winning 
election is examined in several different variants, including 
maximization of expected plurality, maximization of expected number 
of votes, maximization of the probability of winning, and others. 
One major problem encountered in basic election theory is that, 
once the assumption of a symmetric distribution of ideal points2 is 
dropped, with simple preference-based voting and two or more issues, 
a pure strategy equilibrium will seldom exist for the candidates. The 
2A voter's ideal point is the point in the underlying issue space that the 
voter finds as good or better than all other possible points in the issue 
space 
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question of what conditions are necessary and/ or sufficient for the 
existence of stability and a dominant strategy in a multidimensional 
spatial model was first examined by Plott ( 1967), and has since 
become the subject of a great deal of research (Davis, DeGroot and 
Hinich 1972; Kramer 1973). With few exceptions, under these more 
realistic assumptions, a candidate can potentially be defeated no 
matter what policy positions he/ she adopts. McKelvey (1979) further 
found that when the above assumptions failed to produce a pure 
strategy equilibrium, it allowed for a candidate to potentially win 
regardless of his/ her positions on the issues. By the late 1970's and 
early 1980's, several theorists had abandoned any hope of ever using 
the spatial theory of elections to predict candidate behavior (Riker 
1980). 
The future of election theory lay with the understanding that 
elections are a contest not simply between policy alternatives but 
between individuals. Modeling voter behavior in elections requires 
taking into account the existence of some degree of randomness in any 
spatial model of elections. While the behavior of each individual voter 
is wholely rational and non-random, any model which attempts to 
agregate the behavior of a large number of voters will inevitably result 
in a great deal of unexplained variation. This randomness is induced by 
several features inherent in elections, including abstention from either 
alienation of indifference, nonpolicy characteristics of the candidates, 
omitted policy vectors in the model, measurement error, and other 
factors. Modeling, which recognized these factors and included a 
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probabilistic theory of voter behavior, began as early as 1972 with 
Hinich, Ledyard, and Ordeshook, but received little attention until the 
late 1 970's and early 1 980's (Hinich 1977; Coughlin and Nitzan 1 981 ). 
Such probabilistic models seem a much more reasonable means of 
modeling the low information environment of the electorate, and the 
sufficient conditions for pure strategy equilibrium in a two-candidate, 
multidimensional model are much less restrictive for probabilistic 
than for non-probabilistic models (Enelow and Hinich 1989). 
The early 1 980's also saw the birth of an alternate approach to 
modeling elections which was designed not to determine the existence 
or non-existence of a pure strategy equil ibrium for candidates, but to 
add additional realism to the model and determine the behavior of 
voters in the absence of extensive information on the positions of the 
candidates. McKelvey and Ordeshook(l 985) introduced a rational 
expectations model of voter behavior. In their model, the uninformed 
voters determine which candidate to vote for based exclusively on the 
information provided in public opinion polls. McKelvey and Ordeshook 
found that, under a very few weak assumptions, these 'uninformed' 
voters will extract sufficient information from the public opinion polls 
to vote as they would be expected to if fully informed of the candidates 
positions. 
Enelow and Hinich (1984) developed a model of voter behavior in 
which the voter estimates the candidates position in voter space based 
on the set of shorthand labels applied to the candidate, such as the 
Democrat/Republican, liberal/conservative, etc. While the model does 
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offer appeal through its resemblance to observed electorate behavior, 
the justification for the model is more empirical. By reducing a large, 
multidimensional issue space to a relatively small 'political label' 
space in which both voters and candidates can be located The work of 
both McKelvey and Ordeshook and Enelow and Hinich is based on the 
critical question for election theory of how the electorate uses 
shorthand devices such as polls and party affiliation to cut down on the 
information costs that would be incurred to become truly informed on 
the candidates. 
Other means of finding equilibria in election theory have included 
mixed minimax strategy solutions (Mc Kelvey and Ordeshook 1 976; 
Kramer 1978), stochastic equilibrium (Ferejohn, Fiorina and Packel 
1 978) and dynamic stability (Kramer 1977). Questions about the worth 
of these models, however, has caused them to fall into disuse (Enelow 
and Hinich 1990). 
While the primary focus of spatial election theory has been in 
finding the equilibrium, a body of literature has focused on other 
aspects of elections. Bra ms ( 1980), Palfry ( 1 984) and Cox ( 1 990), have 
used spatial election models to examine the results of electoral 
competition between three or more candidates, with or without entry. 
Sugden ( 1 984) and Cox ( 1987) have researched the results of 
proportional representation systems on the results of spatial election 
theory. 
Another area of interest to election theorists has been examined 
by Greenberg (1979), Schofield (1986), and Caplin and Nalebuff (1988). 
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All have examined the implications for elections of increasing the size 
of the winning vote from a simple majority to a larger majority. Not 
surprisingly, they have found that as the size of a majority increases, 
potential equilibrium points become more and more plentiful. 
Riker (1986) has examined a different variant on the voter space 
model in which the candidates in an election have the ability to 
increase the dimensionality of voter space. Riker introduced what he 
calls Herestetics to the theory of elections by suggesting that 
candidates will attempt to win an election by the strategic 
introduction of new issues, and hence new dimensions, into the voter 
space which will act to increase the candidates' chances of election. 
The Basic Spatial Election Model 
The most basic spatial election model, on which all more 
advanced models are based, involves an election based on a single 
dimension. consider a population involved in an election, in which each 
individual's most preferred political policy could be mapped as a single 
point on a single dimension. The most frequently used dimension in a 
one dimensional model is that of left-right political ideology; thus, a 
very liberal individual might be mapped as a point on the far left end of 
the single predictive dimension, and a right-winger might be mapped as 
a point on the right end of the predictive dimension. Every voter can be 
mapped onto the predictive dimension in this manner, and in a 
campaign, the candidates can also be mapped as a point on the 
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predictive dimension, in accordance with the policy positions they 
adopt for the campaign. 
The other primary assumption of the simple spatial model is that 
every voter will most prefer the candidate whose position on the 
predictive dimension is closest to the location of that voter's most 
preferred point on the predictive dimension. Th is is the simple 
Euclidean distance rule, wh ich means that a voter i, whose position on 
the predictive dimension is represented by Vi will prefer (and so vote 
for) a candidate A (located at a point A on the predictive dimension) to 
a candidate B (located at a point B on the predictive dimension) only if 
IA - Vj I < I B - Vjl 
and will vote for B if 
IB - Vjl < IA - Vjl 
and if 
IA - Vjl = I B - Vjl 
then the voter i will be indifferent between the two candidates. 
In this and any spatial elections model, a special significance can 
be attached to the position on the predictive dimension of the median 
voter (the median voter is the voter whose position on the predictive 
dimension is such that half of the voters' ideal points lie on either side 
of the median voter's ideal point). The significance of the median voter 
is that, so long as their are an odd number of voter, with two 
candidates competing for a simple majority of the votes, the candidate 
who wins the vote of the median voter cannot lose the election. 
1 1 
For sake of argument, let A < B. All voters whose most preferred 
points lie to the right of B will vote for B, since they are clearly closer 
to B then to A. Likewise, all voters to the left of A will vote for 
candidate A. All voters whose ideal points are equal to B will vote for 
B and those whose ideal points are equal to A will vote for A. B will 
also capture all of the voters between A and B who are closer to B then 
to A, and A will capture all the votes between A and B closer to A. So A 
will capture all of the voters' whose ideal points lie to the left of the 
point (A + B) I 2 and B will capture all of the votes to the right of that 
point. If the median voter's most preferred point, vmed, lies to the 
right of (A + B) I 2 (as in figure 1 ), then the median voter, and every 
voter to the right of the median voter, will vote for B, and (by the 
definition of the median voter) B will win the election. On the other 
hand, if vmed lies to the left of (A + B) I 2, then the median voter and 
every voter to the left of the median voter will vote for A, and 
candidate A will win the election. 
A (A + B) I 2 v med B 
Figure 1: An election in one dimension, in which B will capture 
the median voter and win the election. 
Because any two-way campaign will be won by the candidate who 
captures the vote of the median voter, another conclusion can be 
reached: if a candidate's location on the predictive dimension is the 
same as the position of the median voter, then the candidate cannot be 
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beaten by any a candidate located anyplace else on the predictive 
dimension in a pairwise election with majority rule . If a candidate A 
is located at the same point as the median voter, and their opponent is 
more conservative (to the right of the median on the predictive 
dimension), then A is guaranteed to capture the median voter and every 
voter to the left of the median voter, and so will win the election. If 
the "median candidate's" opponent is more liberal (to the left on the 
predictive dimension) then the "median candidate" will capture the 
median voter and all who are more conservative than the median voter, 
and so is guaranteed a majority. Thus, the position of a median voter is 
a Condorcet winner3. 
Worth noting is the special cases where either the two 
candidates lie at the same point on the predictive dimension, or where 
the median voter lies exactly halfway between the two candidates 
(that is, on the point (A + B) I 2). In these cases, the results of the 
election are indeterminate. The election in this case will be 
determined by the indeterminate behavior of indifferent voters. These 
cases, however, do not pose a major problem, since the likelihood of 
these cases occurring are essentially nil. 
The other candidate location which might be cause of some 
concern to theorists is the case of both candidates locating themselves 
on the median voter. This special case might appear quite problematic; 
it has been shown that the candidate located at the same point as the 
3A Condorcet winner is any candidate (or issue) that defeats all others in 
a pairwise majority rule comparison. 
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median voter cannot be beaten, so naturally both candidates might be 
expected to locate themselves at the ideal point of the median voter. 
The end result, then, would seem to be that both candidates would 
locate themselves at the median voter, and the model can tell us very 
little about the outcome of the election. However, the candidates in 
the election cannot be expected to have perfect information on the 
location of the median voter, and the median voter's ideal point will not 
necessarily remain static. The result on these uncertainties regarding 
the location of the median voter is that, while both candidates can be 
expected to attempt to locate themselves at the median, the likelihood 
of either, let alone both, candidates successfully locating at the 
median is so slight as to be of little concern. Both candidates would 
likely locate very near the median, but spatial voting theory will be 
unable to predict a winner if both candidates locate themselves at 
precisely the location of the median voter 
The Enelow-Hinich Spatial Election Model 
Perhaps the most comprehensive model of the spatial theory of 
elections, and the one examined in more detail here, is that originated 
by Enelow and Hinich ( 1984 ) . 
The most basic models, like the one described briefly above, 
assume that the voters are in full understanding of the policy options, 
and all have the same perception of the status quo policy and all the 
alternatives. Such models work well as an abstract representation of 
direct democracies, but a slightly different variation on the spatial 
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voting model is needed for an analysis of indirect democracies, where 
there are a large number of voters voting not for a set of policies but 
for a candidate for political office. The spatial theory of elections, in 
many variations, has been used to explain the behavior of both 
candidates and voters in indirect democracies. 
In a representative democracy, the candidates take on the role 
played by policy options in a direct democracy. But the choice between 
two candidates is more than just a choice between two policies or two 
sets of policies. Each candidate will, to some extent, stake out a 
position on the issues of the campaign, and the voters, also to some 
extent, will base their vote on the policy positions that the various 
candidates choose. But the range of policies and issues embodied in a 
single vote in an election is far more diverse and complex than the 
relatively limited set of policy options embodied in a vote in a direct 
democracy. Any large issue, such as the national debt, is likely to be 
discussed only in the broadest of terms, leaving voters with only a 
general idea of what the candidate's exact policy position is. Unlike 
issues examined in direct democracies (and modeled in the spatial 
theory of committees) , the policy options as embodied by candidates in 
indirect democracies are likely to be much less clearly delineated. 
Exacerbating the problem of a lack of specificity in the 
discussion of policy issues by candidates is the problem of information 
costs. The vast majority of voters in elections lack incentive to invest 
much time, energy, or money into acquiring information about the 
policy positions of the candidates. When the vote of any single 
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individual is "watered down" by the votes of millions of others, it is 
unreasonable to assume that the voter would devote as many resources 
in examining the candidates as they would if the ir decision was 
decisive in determining the outcome of the election. Because the 
individual voter's choice of whom to vote for wil l ultimately have very 
little impact on the outcome of the election, and thus very little 
impact on the utility experienced by that voter, they will have little 
incentive to seek out information about the candidates. 
It is also noteworthy that policy issues are not the only issues 
that will be raised during a campaign, and not the only issues on which 
voters will base their votes. While candidates take positions on such 
issues as the debt, foreign policy, energy policy, entitlements, and so 
on, the characteristics of the candidates themselves are also issues. 
The age of a candidate, the experience of a candidate, the intelligence 
of a candidate or the morality of a candidate have all been issues in 
election campaigns. The position of a candidate on these nonpolicy 
issues is both important to voter perception of the candidate, and 
clearly beyond the control of the candidate. 
Typically, voters receive information on the candidates through 
indirect means, such as newspapers and television. These sources 
generally present a simplified analysis of the candidates, with 
information on policy issues being particularly scant. Candidates are 
generally described with shorthand labels such as "New Deal democrat" 
of "fiscal conservative." While these shorthand descriptions are brief, 
they do convey a great deal of information on policy positions to the 
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voters. A New Deal democrat might be expected to advocate an 
increase in social welfare spending, cuts in defense spending, a more 
progressive tax structure, increased regulation of private enterprise, 
as well as a number of other implied policy positions. The shorthand 
labels attached to candidates have the effect of greatly simplifying 
discourse on candidate positions by avoiding the alternative of 
presenting an enormous list of the candidates' positions on each 
individual issue. Given the lack of incentive on the part of voters to 
gather information on the candidates, political labels seem an ideal 
means of communicating candidates' positions to voters. 
The labeling of political candidates is key to many models of 
spatial election theory, most notably that advanced by Enelow and 
Hinich ( 1 984 ). In this model it is assumed that the political labels may 
be arranged into one or more predictive dimensions that represent the 
underlying space in which the electoral competition takes place. 
assume for the time being that there is a single predictive dimension 
(see figure 2). The dimension most often used is the classic left-
right ideological dimension proposed by Downs (1957). What is 
assumed in this model is that each candidate may be given a label along 
..... I 
4 
Ultraliberal 
Liberal 
4 
Moderate 
Liberal 
1...,. 
C
Moderate 1 Ultraconservative onservative 
Moderate Conservative 
Figure 2: A classic left-right predictive dimension. 
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this predictive dimension, ranging from ultraliberal to liberal, 
moderate liberal, moderate, moderate conservative, conservative and 
ultraconservative. More points of the single predictive dimension could 
be identified by attaching more adjectives, the essential requirement 
being that the labels may be viewed in a natural linear ordering, like 
numbers on a number line. It is further assumed that a the label a 
candidate has cannot be changed in the space of a single election. 
While many politicians manage, to some extent, to change their 
perceived political ideology over the course of a decades long political 
career, it is difficult to conceive of a candidate convincingly changing 
political ideologies over the course of a single campaign. 
Also key to this model of elections is the assumption that while 
all voters share a common perception of the set of political labels 
assigned to each candidate, each label may suggest a different set of 
policy implications to different voters. The result of these two 
assumptions is that political debates are framed in terms of the 
ideological labels, but the labels assigned to the candidates are 
subjectively interpreted into a set of policy positions by each 
individual voter. 
Critical to the analysis of voter behavior, then, is the question of 
how voters translate the predictive dimension as defined by the 
predictive label into a set of policy positions in the mind of each 
individual voter. If we are given two candidates, A and B whose 
location on predictive dimension n shall be denoted na and nb 
respectively. All voters, as discussed before, will know these labels, 
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which are fixed for the duration of the campaign, but they will not 
necessarily agree on the policy positions implied by the predictive 
labels. 
Suppose that Aij is the estimate of candidate A's position on 
issue j by voter i. The question is how does i arrive at that estimate of 
A's position on j? The simplest model is based on the assumption that 
A's policy position on j is a linear function of his position on the 
predictive dimension rr , as shown in figure 3. Let Wij(n:) denote voter 
i's estimate of a candidates position on issue j as a function of the 
predictive label n: attached to that candidate. The simplest functional 
form which might be used would be 
wu(n:) = mij + n:Vij 
where mij and Vij are the intercept and slope coefficients , respectively, 
of the linear function . With this linear prediction rule, where policy 
positions are a function of the candidate's predict ive label alone, then 
it follows that voter i's estimate of candidate A's position on policy 
issue j would be 
Au = mu + 1ta Vjj 
and his estimate of the position of candidate B on issue j would be 
Bij = mu + itb Vij 
with Bij being voter i's estimate of candidate B's position on issue j . 
Worth noting is that no point on the predictive dimension rr can be 
considered an absolute origin. Any point on rr can be designated as the 
origin, and the absolute difference between any two points may be used 
as a unit of measurement. Accordingly, for consistency, one may set 
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j 
II 
Figure 3: A simple linear function by which voter predicts 
candidate A's position on issue j . 
the origin of II equal to the position of candidate A on the predictive 
dimension. Likewise, in the case of two candidates with different 
locations on the predictive dimension, the absolute difference between 
the positions of candidates A and B shall be used as a unit of 
measurement. With the introduction of these standards, na = 0 and Aij = 
mij, so mij is voter i's perception of A's position on issue j. By using l:rca 
+ itbl as the unit of measurement along rr, one must set 3tb = 1 or :rcb = -
1. Which one to choose is entirely arbitrary, but since liberal-
conservative ideology is generally arrayed with labels to the left as 
more liberal and to the right as more conservative, it would be 
reasonable to assign Jtb = 1 if B is more conservative than A, and 3tb = -
1 if B is more liberal than A. 
Suppose, then, that B is to the right of A on the predictive 
dimension (B more conservative than A) . Then A's position on issue j 
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as perceived by i is mij + Vij · The expected sign of Vij , which 
represents the perceived difference between the two candidates, might 
be positive, negative, or zero, depending on the nature of issue j and its 
perceived relationship to the predictive dimension. If, for example, j is 
defense spending, then Vij is likely to be positive, with the more 
conservative candidate, B, advocating a larger defense expenditure than 
A. If j were welfare expenditure, then Vij might be negative - the more 
conservative the candidate the less welfare spending they will 
advocate. On the other hand, if j were a subject such as NATO policy, 
which is relatively nonpartisan, then Vij might well be zero. 
Suppose that there are two issues in a campaign, with one 
underlying predictive dimension. Continuing with the above 
assumptions, TCa = 0 and nb = 1 represent the positions of the candidates 
on the predictive dimension. In the case of a two issue campaign, the 
most preferred policy options of each of the voters can be represented 
as a two-dimensional vector. For example, voter i's most preferred 
policy options on issues 1 and 2 may be represented by the vector Xi = 
(i 1, iz). 
For example, let us suppose that the two issues in the campaign 
are spending on welfare programs (issue 1) and defense spending (issue 
2), measured as a percentage increase or decrease from the status quo. 
The location of the most preferred points of three voters i, j , and k 
might be represented by the vectors Xi = (.2, O) , Xj = ( -.2, .2), and Xk = 
(0, .1 ). Thus, for example, voter i would most prefer to see a 20% 
increase in welfare spending and no change in defense expenditures. 
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For simplicity one assumes that all voter preferences are based on 
simple Euclidean distance; in other words, each voter weighs the two 
issues equally, and the preferences are independent across the two 
issues. 
The next necessary information is the voters' estimation 
coefficients. For the purpose of simplifying the mathematics involved, 
let us assume that candidate A (the candidate who lies at the origin of 
P) is the incumbent in the race, and that all voters share a common 
perception of the current policies on both dimensions. Then, Ail = Aiz = 
Ajl = Ajz = Akl = Akz = O; also, Bil =Vil ' Biz = ViZ , Bjl = Vjl' Bjz = VjZ . 
Bk1 = Vkl, and Bk1 = Vkl . Suppose that voter i, understanding that the 
challenger, B, is more conservative than incumbent A, expects B to 
decrease welfare expenditures by 40% and increase defense spending by 
20%. Then Vil = -.4 and Viz = .2. Voters j and k might have slightly 
different estimates of B's positions on the issues, such that Vj 1 = -.3 
and VjZ = .1 Vkl = -.1 and VkZ = .2. 
Remember that the voter will prefer the candidate whose 
estimated position in the policy space is closest to the voters ideal 
point. In two-dimensional Euclidean space (the space which 
corresponds with the assumed two issue election), the distance 
between two points, say voter i's ideal policy point and voter i's 
estimation of the location of candidate A, is given by the formula 
llAi - xiii = [(Ail - i1 ) Z + (Aiz - iz)Z]l 12 
and the Euclidean distance between i's ideal policy bundle and i's 
estimate of the policies of candidate B is given by 
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llBi - Xiii = [(Bi1 - i1 )2 + (Biz - iz) 2] 112 
substituting the numbers from the example set out above, we find that 
llAi - Xiii= ((0 - .2)2 + (O - 0)2]1 / 2 = .2 
and 
llBi - Xiii = (( -.4 - .2)2 + (.2 - 0)2]1 12 = .63 
Since the voter prefers the candidate nearest to his most preferred 
bundle, because llAi - Xiii < llBi - Xiii, voter i would vote for candidate A. 
One can also determine i's candidate preference solely in terms of 
the predictive dimension. Because 
Ai = (Ail, Ai2) = mi + na Vi= (mi1 + ita Vil , miz + n a Viz) 
the Euclidean distance between Ai and Xi can be expressed as 
[(mil+ na Vil - Xi1)2 + (mi2 + na Vi2 - Xi2)2 ]1 / 2 
The Euclidean distance between Bi and Xi may be expressed similarly. 
With these two formulas, and the simple Euclidean distance preference 
rule, we know that voter i will prefer the challenger, B, to A if and only 
if 
[(mil+ Jta Vil - Xi1)2 + (mi2 + Jta ViZ - Xi2)2]l / 2 > 
[(mil + Jtb Vil - Xi1)2 + (mi2 + Jt b Vj2 - Xiz)2 ] 1 / 2 
Squaring both sides of the equation, multiplying through, and gathering 
like terms, we find that B is preferred only if 
(nb2 - na2) (vi1 2 + Vi22) < 
2(na - Jtb) (mi1Vi1 + mi2Vi 2 - Vi1Xi1 - Vj zX 12) 
Factoring (n:b - n:a) from both sides, gathering terms, and diving through 
leaves 
[vi1 (Xi1 - mi1) +Viz (Xi2 - mi2)] I (vi12 - Vi22) > (n:a + itb) I 2 
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The left hand side of this equation (which shall henceforth be labeled 
Zi) represents the most preferred point for voter i on the predictive 
dimension - that is, the point on the predictive dimension which lies 
closest to the voter's most preferred policy bundle in the two -
dimensional policy space. As demonstrated in figure 4, the set of all 
policy estimates by voter i based upon predictive dimension n is 
defined by the line mi + nVi. The estimates (by voter i) of the location 
of candidates A and B in the issue space are given by mi + naVi and 
issue 2 
z . 
1 
issue 1 
Figure 4: Voter i's prediction of the locations of candidates A and 
B on the two issues (welfare and defense). Note that 
the location of i's most preferred point on predictive 
dimension lies closer to A than to B, and so voter i will 
vote for candidate A. 
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mi + nbVi respectively. The question then becomes: for which candidate 
will i vote? All voters are assumed to follow the simple Euclidean 
distance preference rule, so i will view all points on the issue space 
that are the same distance from his/her ideal point as being equally 
preferred, and the farther away a point in issue space is from voter i's 
ideal point, the less preferred that policy option. In figure 4 , all of the 
points on the each individual circle centered on Xi will be equally 
preferred (they are all the same Euclidean distance from Xi), and all 
points on the smallest circle about Xi are preferred to the set of points 
on the middle circle (all points on the middle circle being farther from 
Xi), and so on. 
The point Zi, the most preferred point of voter i on the predictive 
dimension, is located at the intersection of the predictive dimension 
with the perpendicular that passes through the point Xi, that is, Zi is 
the point on the predictive dimension which lies closest to Xi. Because 
the point Zi is closer to A than to B, Zi < (na + nb) I 2, voter i prefers Ai 
to B;. 
Note that the voter's ideal point in the issue space, Xi is not the 
same point as the voter's most preferred point on the predictive 
dimension, Zj. The issue positions associated with Zi are given by mi1 + 
Zi v;1 and m;z + Zi Viz for issues 1 and 2. These points are different 
from the ideal policy positions in the policy space Xi 1 and Xi2, except in 
the special case where the ideal policy bundle for i, Xi, lies on the 
predictive dimension n. 
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The model is designed specifically to avoid any reference to the 
ideology of the voter. While the ideology of the candidates is used as a 
predictive device, the ideology of the voters plays no role in the model. 
While the voter's ideal policy position is critical, the method by which 
the voter finds his ideal policy position is external to the model, and 
unnecessary to predict election behavior. Again, looking at the figure, 
Xi does not correspond with any point on the predictive "ideology" 
dimension. Furthermore, over the course of a campaign, the actions of 
the candidates can change the Zi's of the voters, so that unlike the 
candidates' n's, the most preferred points of the voters can change over 
the course of the election. 
It is also important to note that the linear estimation procedure 
induces a single peaked preference curve for each voter on the 
predictive dimension n. The points on the predictive dimension are 
less preferred the more distant they are from the point mi + ZiVi. Thus, 
voter i will prefer A to B only if Ina - Zil < lnb - zjl. 
The importance of this result is that, for the case of a singe 
predictive dimension, we can use a form of the median voter result to 
determine which candidate will tie or win the election. We can define 
a median for the set of most preferred points z on the underlying 
predictive dimension. In the case of the example set forth above, 
Zi = [-.4(.2 - 0) + .2(0- O)] I (.16 + .04) = -.4 
Zj = [ -.3( -.2 - O) + . 1 (.2 - O)] I (.09 + .01) = .8 
Zk = [ -.1(0 - O) + .2(.1 - O)] I (.01 + .04) = .4 
26 
so Zmed = Zk = .4. Consequently, since .4 < (ita + rtb) I 2 = .5, Zmed is 
closer to rta = 0. Thus, A will win a majority of the votes (the votes of 
i and k) . 
With a single predictive dimension, the candidate whose position 
on the predictive dimension lies closest to Zmed either ties or wins the 
election. However, because the n's attached to the candidates are 
fixed, the candidate competition consists of trying to move Zmed closer 
to the candidate's position. This means the that candidates must 
attempt to alter the Vij'S and mij 's; and thus the Zij'S, of the individual 
voters. When candidates debate what each one's policy positions are, 
they are attempting to alter the coefficients of the translation 
function by which policy positions are mapped into positions on the 
predictive dimension. 
We assume that changes in the bij'S and Vij'S of individual voters 
are the result of a deliberate effort on the part of the candidates to 
alter the location of Zmed· Whichever candidate is farther from Zmed is 
attempting to alter the bij'S and vu 's of enough voters to move Zmed 
closer to him than to his opponent. Likewise, his opponent is 
attempting to make certain that Zmed stays closer to him than to his 
opponent. 
The problem for the candidates then becomes how to alter voter 
perceptions in such a way as to move Zmed in their favor. In our 
example, the original Zmed = .4, which is closer to A than to 8. Clearly, 
it becomes B's goal to move zmed closer to itb = 1. 
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Suppose that B can exert some influence over the Vij'S of the 
individual voters. Further, suppose that vu can be expressed as the sum 
of a constant effect under the control of the candidates, and a random 
effect beyond the candidates' control. If this constant effect is equal 
to the average Vij across i and residual term is i's perceptual bias with 
respect to Vj , we can express Vij as 
Vij = Vj + Ejj 
where Vj is the average vu and Eij is the residual term representing the 
perceptual bias of i on the issue. Then how would candidate B wish to 
alter Vj to move Zmed closer to 1? 
Given the data in the example, 
v 1 = ( -.1 - .3 - .4 ) I 3 = -.2 67 
v2 = ( . 2 + . 2 + . 1 ) I 3 = . 1 6 7 
so that Ei1 = -.4 + .267 = -.1 33 , Ej l = -.3 + .267 = -.033, and Ek1 = -.1 
+ .267 = .167; likewise, Ei2 = .2 - .167 = .033, Ej2 = .1 -. 167 = -.67, and 
Ek 1 = . 2 - . 1 6 7 = . 0 3 3. 
If B possessed this information, then the question becomes what 
it would be best to change v1 and v2 to. Because in this example Xi, Xj, 
and Xk all happen to lie in a line in the issue space, Xmed = Xk is a unique 
dominant point. It would therefore be best for B to attempt to alter v1 
and vz so as to move the perception of his policy positions as close as 
possible to Xk = (O, .1 ). Because Bi = (vi 1, Viz) = (v1 + Eil, vz + EiZ), Bj = 
(vj1 , VjZ) = (v1 + Ejl, vz + EjZ ), and Bk = (Vk 1, Vkz) = (v1 + Ek l , vz + EkZ) , 
setting (v1, v2) = ( -.167, .067) will change Bi from ( -.4, .2) to ( -.3 , .1 ), 
Bj from ( -.3, .1) to ( -. 2, O), and Bk from ( -.1, .2) to (0, .1 ). Such a 
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change will move Zi to -.6 and both Zj and Zk to 1 . So if candidate B 
can convince the voters that the changes he would enact on the two 
issues are less than the voters initially assumed, he can win the votes 
of both and k. 
Candidate A, on the other hand, would be benefited by an opposite 
change in v1 and vz. Suppose for example that vz remains unchanged, 
but v1 is changed to -.3. Further suppose that all voter bias on issue 1 
is eliminated, so Vi1 = Vj l = Vkl = -.3. Then each voter will believe 
that candidate B will enact a 30% decrease in welfare spending. The 
result of such a change in perceptions would be to move the most 
preferred points of the voters to Zi = -.6, Zj = .67, and Zk = .1. The 
incumbent now would receive the votes of i and k and would win the 
election. What has happened in this last example is that candidate A 
has successfully changed voter perceptions of the way in which the 
predictive label maps into the issue space. Specifically, the result has 
been to convince voters that B's more conservative label translates 
into much larger cuts in welfare expenditures than the voters 
originally believed. in this instance, such a suggestion is particularly 
alarming to k, who advocates the status quo on the issue. 
The discussion to this point has been limited to the simplest 
case, an election involving a single predictive dimension and two 
issues. The model can be expanded to include any number of issues 
and/ or predictive dimensions. Consider, for example, the case of a 
campaign involving two issues and two predictive dimensions. 
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A model with two predictive dimensions might include a 
economic liberal - conservative axis, and a social liberal conservative 
axis, to represent the fundamental separability of economic and social 
policy. The economic axis might be used as a shorthand label for the 
degree to which the candidate advocates government intervention in 
business, with conservatives at the right end of the axis advocating 
less intervention and liberals at the left end of the axis advocating 
greater intervention. The social liberal-conservative axis is, perhaps, 
less well defined, but the label would reflect the candidate's positions 
on social issues. The liberal (left) end of the axis might advocate 
greater government intervention in issues like integration, affirmative 
action, and bilingual education, and less government intervention in 
issues such as free speech, drug use, and public morality. The 
conservative (right) end of the axis might favor heavy government 
intervention on issues such as homosexuality, abortion, and 
pornography, and relatively little intervention on matters such as 
integration, affirmative action and prayer in schools. 
Consider once again candidates A and B, With voters having a 
common understanding of the location of incumbent candidate A in both 
the issue space and the policy space, and a common understanding of 
the location of challenger B. Thus A's positions on predictive 
dimensions 1 and 2 are na = (na 1, :rcaz) = (O, O) and B's positions on the 
predictive dimensions are rtb = (:rcb 1, rtb2) = ( 1, 1 ). B in this example is 
considered more conservative on both predictive dimensions (both rtbl 
and XbZ are positive). 
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Let us consider predictive dimension 1 to be the economic 
predictive dimension and predictive dimension 2 to be the social 
predictive dimension. Likewise, consider issue 1 to be an economic 
issue and issue 2 to be a social issue. Then voter i's perception of 
voter B's policy position would be 
Bi = (Bi1, Biz) = 
(mi1+Vill1tb1 + Vi211tb2, miz + Vi12 :rcb1 + Vi221tb2) 
where mik is i's perception of the incumbents policy on issue k (k = 1, 
2) and Vijk is i's perception of the change in position on issue k 
associated with a one unit change in the jth predictive dimension. For 
example, Vi 11 is the marginal change in Bil given a unit change in :rcb 1 
and Vi21 is the marginal change in Bi1 given a unit change in :rcbZ· 
For purposes of simplification, assume that the predicted 
location of the candidates on the economic issue is a function only of 
the economic predictive dimension, and that the predicted location of 
the candidates on the social issue is solely a function of the social 
predictive dimension. Then Vil 2 = Vi21 = 0, and 
Bi= (Bi1. Biz)= (mi1 + Vi11 , miz + vi22) 
and 
Ai= (Ai1, Aiz) = (mi1 , miz) 
Once again using the weighted Euclidean distance preference rule 
(assuming that the two issues are weighted equally by the voter and 
are completely separable), and squaring both sides, voter i prefers 
challenger B to A only if 
(Vil 1 - Xj 1 + m;1 )2 + (ViZZ - Xi2 + mi2)2 < 
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( - Xil + mi1 )2 + ( - Xi2 + mi2)2 
which would reduce to 
Vil 12 - 2Vi112 Zi1 + Vi222 - 2Vi22 2 Zi2 < Q 
where Zil = (Xi1 - mil) I Vi11 and Zi2 = (Xi2 - mi2) I Vi22 are points on 
predictive dimensions 1 and 2, respectively. The above equation may be 
rewritten 
[vi11 (xi1 - rn1) + Vi22 (xi2- rn2)] I (vi11 2 + vi 22 2 > 112 
or 
(vi11Z Zi1 + Vi222 zi2) I (vil 12 + vi222) > 112 
so that voter i will prefer candidate B to candidate A only if the above 
inequality holds. 
Note that this model is merely a two-dimensional generalization 
of the single predictive dimension model examined earlier. Regardless 
of the number of dimensions in the issue space and the number of 
predictive dimensions, the determination of a voter's preference 
between two candidates is, in fact, found in the same manner. The 
voter's estimation of the candidates' locations on the underlying issue 
space, based on the candidates' locations in the predictive space, is 
calculated. Then, the location of the voter's most preferred point in the 
predictive space is calculated. Finally (assuming one keeps the simple 
Euclidean distance preference rule) , the distance between the voter's 
most preferred point in the predictive space and each of the candidate's 
locations in the predictive space is measured, and the candidate who is 
located closer to the voter will be the preferred candidate, regardless 
of the number of dimensions in the predictive or the issue space. 
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The case of a voter basing his candidate preference on more than one 
predictive dimension is different in one critical way from the single 
predictive dimension model. In the single predictive dimension model, 
the median voter is critical to the outcome of the election; the 
candidate that captures the vote of the median voter will win the 
election, and the candidate who holds the same location on the 
predictive dimension as the median voter's most preferred point cannot 
be beaten in pairwise competition. But with more than one predictive 
dimension, a dominant strategy cannot be guaranteed. In order for a 
dominant strategy to exist with multiple predictive dimensions, it is 
necessary that there exist a median in all directions. In two-
dimensional predictive space, a median in all directions exists at a 
voter most preferred point x if any line passing through x places at 
least one half of all voter most preferred points on each side of the 
line (counting all most preferred points on the line, including x, as 
being on both sides). Consider figure 5, with lines one and two passing 
through x, the median voter in the eleven voter, two-dimensional 
predictive space. Line one divides the space into eight voters on the 
left side of the space and seven voters on the right (counting the four 
voters on the line on both sides). Line two divides the space into six 
voters on each side. Every line drawn through x will have the 
characteristic of maintaining a majority on either side of the line, so x 
is a median in all directions. 
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Figure 5: The point x is a median in all directions. 
Likewise, in three-dimensional predictive space, a median in all 
directions exists at voter most preferred point x if for any plane 
passing through x at least one half of all voter most preferred points 
lie on either side of the plane (counting all most preferred points on 
the plane, including x, on both sides). 
The requirement that there exist a median in all directions for a 
dominant strategy to exist is quite stringent. However, the absence of 
a dominant strategy does not mean that the model cannot accurately 
predict election outcomes and candidate behavior. With or without a 
dominant point, the model does explain how candidates will attempt to 
alter the mu's and Vijk 's of the voters in order to preserve or gain a 
winning position. Thus, one can gain insight into actual electorate and 
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candidate behavior without a dominant strategy existing (Enelow and 
Hinich 1 984 ). 
The spatial theory of elections, as demonstrated even in the 
relatively simple form presented here, can potentially become 
enormously complex. Despite this complexity, the model is, at its 
heart, quite elegant. The only fundamental assumption of the spatial 
voting model is that voters and candidates will act in their rational 
self interest, where rational self interest is defined only in the 
loosest of terms: a voter's or candidate 's policy positions might be 
based on economic well being, religious or moral principles, or on 
nothing at all. The only requirement is that the individuals act 
rationally to realize the policy positions that they most prefer. This 
fundamental assumption is tremendously intuitively appealing, and 
from that simple assumption, the spatial theory of elections, and its 
vast potential for unraveling the complexities of election behavior, 
can be naturally derived. 
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AN ANALYSIS OF THE PREDICTIVE DIMENSIONS 
An Introduction to the Question 
The spatial model of elections, as set forth by Enelow and 
Hinich, has in recent years become the basis for a good deal of 
research into election behavior. the model has proven to be quite 
useful in explaining voter behavior in several elections, including 
the 1 976 and 1 980 U.S. presidential elections examined by Enelow 
and Hinich (1984). 
However, the model has opened up several paths of inquiry that 
are as yet unexplored. Of particular interest are the obvious 
questions surrounding the voter choice of predictive dimensions and 
the mapping of those predictive dimensions into the issue space. 
While the number of predictive dimensions the voter uses in 
predicting a candidate's policy positions is critical , it is clear from 
the model and subsequent research that little is known about how 
many predictive dimensions the voter actually uses. Also left 
unexplored is the question of how accurately the voter can, in fact, 
predict the location of the candidate on the underlying issue space. 
Clearly, both of these question are important to any model that 
purports to accurately describe voter behavior - a model that has 
voters using one or two predictive dimensions is clearly inadequate 
to describe real-life voters who are using five or six predictive 
dimensions. Further, the accuracy with which voters can predict the 
location of candidates in the issue space (and thus the accuracy with 
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which the voter can determine his/her preferences) is clearly 
critical to understanding the accuracy of the underlying model. 
The research presented here is designed to provide some 
insight, then, into these two fundamental questions regarding the 
nature of the predictive space of the voters: 
1) How many dimension are there to the voters' predictive 
space? and 
2) How accurately does the predictive space of the voter 
describe the nature of the underlying issue space? 
The Dataset and Assumptions of the Model 
Answering these two questions requires, first and foremost, 
some information regarding the nature of the underlying policy 
space. The most comprehensive information regarding the nature of 
the issue space of the United States Congress, for example, might be 
found in the congressional record, with every vote on every bill 
brought before congress characterized as a single dimension on the 
issue space, and the congressman's location on that dimension 
determined by his or her vote on the particular issue. The end result 
would be a issue space with thousands of dimensions, with every 
senator mapped as a point on every dimension. At first examination, 
a policy space which includes every congressperson's vote on every 
issue, being the most comprehensive data available of the 
congresspersons' views, might also appear to be the most desirable 
for a model of the issue space. 
37 
However, such a dataset suffers from certain shortcomings. 
First, it would include as dimensions votes on "issues" that many or 
all voters would not consider relevant to there voting decision 
("National Artichoke Week", for example), and many more dimensions 
would be issues which, while important to a small minority of 
voters, would most likely play little role in the average voter's 
voting decision (the honey subsidy). The dataset is also problematic 
in that it plots candidates at different points in the issue space 
which might be, to a voter aware of the issue space, identical. By 
way of example, consider two congresspersons who have identical 
voting records, but one has voted against federally funded abortion 
and against parental notification of abortion. The other 
congressperson voted the opposite way on these two issue (that is, 
for federal abortion funding and for parental notification). As a 
result, the two congresspeople would reside at different points in 
the issue space - but the voter might well consider the positions of 
the two as identical, in that both are equally pro- or anti-abortion. 
In a sense, then, a breakdown of issue space into one dimension per 
vote creates an issue space that is too disagregated, as well as 
extremely ungainly. 
A much more desirable model of the issue space is provided by 
the Center for National Independence in Politics. This organization 
collects "performance evaluations" on all senators and 
representatives. These performance evaluations consist of a single 
percentage score (0-100) for each congressperson, provided to the 
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center by 21 different special interest groups. Each special interest 
group scores each congressperson by first selecting any number of 
bills which have gone before congress which the interest group feels 
was relevant to their organization's interests. Then, for each 
senator and representative, the organization calculates the 
percentage of votes the congressperson cast in the special interests 
favor; for example, a score of 80% for a representative would mean 
that that representative voted as the special interest would have on 
80% of the bills relevant to that organization's interests. The end 
result of the data collected by the Center for National Independence 
in Politics is that each senator and representative has been given a 
single score by 21 different special interest groups, each score 
representing the degree to which that senator or representative 
conforms to the ideals of the special interest assigning the score. 
Using a few safe assumptions, the data provided by the Center 
for National Independence in Politics provides a comprehensive view 
of the issue space (or that portion which is relevant to the U.S. 
congress), while being much less clumsy than the issue space 
provided by information on every individual vote. First, it is safe to 
assume that every vote which is relevant to any significant number 
of voters is represented in the scores provided by at least one of the 
interest groups. The scores provided by the center are, in fact, 
chosen from the scores produced by over 70 special interest groups 
around the country. The process of gleaning out the 21 most 
relevant scores is done by the center simply by examining which 
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scores are most frequently requested by the reporters, researchers, 
and interested voters who contact the center for such information. 
The vast majority of voters and reporters who contact the center 
are interested in the scores provided by these 21 organizations, 
suggesting that the scores of the other 49 interest groups cover 
issues of interest to only a very small number of individuals. 
One can also safely assume that no irrelevant issues will enter 
the policy space described by the center's 21 scores. The scores are 
provided by 21 significant special interest groups, which are, 
presumably, significant primarily because there interests are also 
the interests of a large number of voters. It is reasonable to assume 
further that no score from any interest group would include an 
" irrelevant" vote in calculating congresspersons' scores, since doing 
so can only serve to "water down" the meaning of the score and 
undermine the credibility of the interest group. 
Finally, one must, and can safely, assume that any two 
congresspeople with the same score from the same interest group 
are equally preferred with regards to the issues of interest to that 
interest group. Because there is no limit to the number of votes 
which can be the basis of any individual organization's score, the 
organizations will choose a body of votes sufficient to distinguish 
between all congresspeople who are, to the point of view of the 
interest group, distinguishable. Conversely, because no "irrelevant" 
votes will be included in any of the scores, any differences in the 
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scores of various congresspeople must reflect actual , relevant 
differences in their locations in the issue space. 
With these assumptions - that every relevant issue is covered, 
that every identical score reflects an identical location in the issue 
space, and that every different score reflects a different location in 
the issue space, it is clear that the 21 scores provided by these 21 
interest groups must, in fact, provide sufficient information to 
locate the candidate in issue space. The issue space examined in 
this paper, then, will be the 21 dimension issue space described by 
the data provided by the Center for National Independence in Politics 
for the United States Congress for 1 992 . Each congressperson's 
score on each of the 21 dimensions is defined be the score provided 
by each of 21 different special interest groups. Only the 400 
congresspeople with scores from all 21 special interests will be 
included in the analysis. 
The 21 special interest groups, as well as what interest they 
represent, are as follows: 
1) U.S. Chamber of Commerce: Business 
2) AFL-CIO: Labor 
3) American Conservative Union: Conservative 
4) Americans for Democratic Action: Liberal 
S) American Security Council: Conservative Defense/ Foreign 
Policy 
6) Council for a Livable World: Liberal Defense/Foreign 
Policy 
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7) National Right to Life Committee: Anti-Abortion 
8) National Abortion Rights Action League: Abortion Rights 
9) National Federation of Independent Business: Business 
1 O) Consumer Federation of America: Consumers 
11) American Civil Liberties Union: Civil Liberties 
12) Christian Voice: Moral/Family Issues 
13) League of Conservation Voters: Environment 
14) National Taxpayer's Union: Taxes 
15) American Association of University Women: Women's 
Issues 
16) American Farm Bureau Federation: Farm Issues 
17) National Council of Senior Citizens: Seniors' issues 
1 8) NAACP: Civil Rights 
19) National Education Association: Education 
20) Liberty Lobby: Populist 
21) Citizens Against Government Waste: Taxes 
One will quickly note that heavy correlation is quite likely 
among several (if not all) of the above scores. For example, one 
expects a strong (negative) correlation between the scores provided 
by the National Right to Life Committee and NARAL, since the 
organizations are working at cross purposes (though the correlation, 
notably, is not 100%). Though this may seem to be a problem, it is in 
fact the very feature that voters will exploit in using predictive 
dimensions to predict a congressperson's location in the 21 
dimension issue space - with heavy correlation among the various 
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dimensions in the issue space, a single predictive dimension can 
potentially predict quite accurately the location of a congressperson 
in the issue space. 
Before exploring the power of predictive dimensions to map 
the space, some minor adjustments were made to the data set both 
to ease interpretation of the dimensions and to allow for application 
of meaningful predictive dimensions. The first step is that each 
score is converted from the raw 0-100 scale to standard deviation 
form. That is, each candidates score on each dimension is 
subtracted from the mean of the 400 scores and the difference is 
divided by the standard deviation on the 400 scores - the result is 
that each score is transformed to a standard form which reflects 
the number of standard deviations that candidate is from the mean 
score for that dimension. This transformation of scores is 
performed to guarantee that, to the extent that the various scores 
are measuring the same phenomenon, they are measuring that 
phenomenon on the same scale and from the same origin - a 
necessary characteristic for subsequent analysis. 
The second transformation, once again needed for subsequent 
analysis - was to adjust the scores so that all were positively 
correlated with some base score, arbitrarily chosen. In this 
instance, the dimension described by the American Conservative 
Union (number 3) was selected. The scores of each dimension 
negatively correlated with the scores given by the American 
Conservative Union was multiplied by -1, so that after adjustment 
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every score , to the extent that it was correlated with the score 
provided by the ACU, was positively correlated4. The decision to use 
the ACU score as the base was based on two factors. First, the 
single dimension most often used in spatial voting theory, and 
generally viewed as the most basic, is the left-right political 
dimension, so choosing a issue dimension that purports to measure 
that dimension seems reasonable. Secondly, when a single left-right 
predictive dimension is used, it is customary to arrange the 
dimension as per a number line, with the political right at the right 
(and thus positive) end of the number line and the pol itical left at 
the left (and thus negative) end of the number line. Thus, to the 
extent that each dimension reflects some political left/ right split, 
the more positive the score the more conservative the 
congressperson, and the more liberal congresspeople will tend to 
have large negative scores. A fortunate characteristic of the issue 
space, with these alterations, is that the scores of every dimension 
are positively correlated with every other dimension. 
With the issue space for the United States Congress for 1 992 
set forth , and the location of the congresspeople in the issue space 
defined, the goal is to determine the nature of the predictive 
dimensions used by the voter to predict the location of these 
congresspeople in the issue space. Calculat ing how a voter will 
4The scores which were negatively correlated with the scores given be the American 
Conservative Union, and which were consequently multiplied by -1 , were (referring to the 
list provided), dimensions number 2, 4 , 6, 8, 10, 11 , 13, 1 5, 17, 18, and 19. The others 
were left in their standard deviation form. 
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chose predictive dimensions, and how those predictive dimensions 
will be mapped into the issue space requires assuming only that the 
voter gather use his/her available information as efficiently as 
possible. With such an assumption it becomes apparent that voters 
will chose as a first predictive dimension that dimension which best 
explains the location of the congressperson, will chose as a second 
dimension that dimension which best explains the difference 
between the prediction given by the first dimension and the 
congresspersons actual location in issue space, will chose as a third 
dimension the dimension which best explains that not explained by 
the first two dimensions, and so on. Further, assuming efficient 
voters, each predictive dimension will be mapped as accurately as 
possible into the underlying issue space. The statistical analysis 
required to model the nature of the predictive dimensions is 
somewhat complex; for expository purposes, a full description of the 
modeling technique, with a sample, can be found in the appendix. 
The First Predictive Dimension 
One obvious characteristic of the best single predictive 
dimension is that it be correlated with at least one of the 21 
dimensions of issue space. The correlation might be positive or 
negative, and for sake of convention, we shall define the dimension 
to be positive (the negatively correlated predictive dimension which 
best describes the data would simply be the negative of the 
positively correlated dimension). Because the dimensions of the 
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issue space are all positively correlated with each other, this first 
predictive dimension will therefore be positively correlated with all 
of the underlying issue dimensions - so it is unnecessary to worry 
about which of the issue dimensions the predictive dimension is 
positively correlated with. The single value which best 
approximates a set of values (by ordinary least squares) is the 
simple mean of those values. The goal of the first predictive 
dimension is simply to provide a single score for each 
congressperson which best estimates scores of that candidate on 
the 21 underlying issue dimension. The predictive dimension which 
most accurately describes the issue space, then, will be given by the 
mean of the 21 dimensions for each of the 400 congresspeople. 
The question then becomes: how accurately will the first predictive 
dimension, given by the means, model the issue space. Recalling 
that voters will use each dimension in the predictive space to 
explain as accurately as possible the predictive space, a least 
squares estimation procedure which regresses each of the 21 issue 
dimensions on the single predictive dimension will provide an 
estimation of the extent to which the predictive dimension explains 
the issue dimension. The R2 value provided by such a regression will 
provide an estimate of the percent of the issue dimension explained. 
A measure of the overall degree to which the predictive dimension 
explains the entire issue space is given by the average of the R2 of 
the regressions (table 1 ). 
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Table 1: The R2 values resulting from the regression of the 
first predictive dimension on each of the 21 
predictive dimensions, with the overall goodness-
of-fit given by the mean R2. 
Dimension 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Interest Group 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
AFL-CIO 
American Conservative Union 
Americans for Democratic Action 
American Security Council 
Council for a Livable World 
National Right to Life Committee 
National Abortion Rights Action League 
R2 
76.4% 
38.1 % 
96.4% 
94.9% 
67.2% 
77.5% 
60.0% 
68.4% 
9 National Federation of Independent Business 86.6% 
1 0 
1 1 
1 2 
1 3 
1 4 
Consumer Federation of America 
American Civil Liberties Union 
Christian Voice 
League of Conservation Voters 
National Taxpayers Union 
88.6% 
95.0% 
92.1% 
73.0% 
63.1 % 
1 5 American Association of University Women 80.7% 
1 6 American Farm Bureau Federation 85.3% 
1 7 National Council of Senior Citizens 86.9% 
1 8 NAACP 88.8% 
1 9 
20 
21 
National Education Association 
Liberty Lobby 
Citizens Against Government Waste 
MEAN 
90.8% 
19.1% 
63.5% 
68.5% 
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What is extraordinary about the first predictive dimension is 
the high degree to which it is capable of explaining the location of 
the underlying issue space. With a single predictive dimension, 
properly chosen and properly fitted to the issue space, the location 
of a congressperson can be calculated with 68.5% accuracy. This 
predictive dimension goes a very long way in describing issue 
dimension 3 and 4, those of the American Conservative Union and 
Americans for Democratic Action, and issue dimensions 11 and 1 2, 
the American Civil Liberties Union and Christian Voice. Because all 
of these organizations are generally considered to be have a liberal 
or conservative position (the ACU and ADA are by design 
conservative and liberal, respectively, while the ACLU and CV have a 
definite strong liberal and strong conservative viewpoint 
respectively), the hypothetical predictive dimension which 
describes these dimensions so thoroughly can be considered the 
political left-right predictive dimension often sighted in spatial 
election research. Thus, the single predictive dimension 
hypothesized by spatial election theorists to be the most important 
and useful, the left-right predictive dimension, is in fact the single 
most efficient predictive dimension when it comes to covering the 
issue space, and will, based on our assumptions regarding voter 
behavior, therefore be the first predictive dimension chosen by the 
voter to predict the nature of the issue space. 
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The Second Predictive Dimension 
The method for finding the best second predictive dimension is 
similar, though slightly more complex, than the method used for 
calculating the first predictive dimension. The best second 
predictive dimension will be that one which, naturally, best predicts 
that portion of the issue space not explained by the fist predictive 
dimension - the second dimension, then, must explain as much as 
possible the residual (error) terms resulting from the regressions of 
each of the issue space dimensions on the first predictive 
dimension. From the regressions run to test the performance of the 
first predictive dimension on the issue space, the residuals are 
saved, yielding 400 individual residuals for each of the 21 issue 
dimensions. As with the original scores, the residuals are adjusted 
to standard deviation form by subtracting each residual value from 
the mean of the standard deviation scores for the issue dimension 
and dividing by the standard deviation of the residual values. As 
with the original values, the adjusted residuals all share an origin 
(the mean score) and have a common scale (number of standard 
deviations from the mean). These adjustments guarantee that, to 
the extent that the various issue space dimensions are correlated, 
they are measuring the same phenomena on the same scale and with 
the same origin. 
The greatest problem encountered in calculating the second 
predictive dimension (and all subsequent dimensions) is that the 
correlation coefficients of all of the 21 sets of residuals cannot 
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(through multiplication of the appropriate dimensions by -1) be 
simultaneously made positive. Much as the various residuals are 
placed in deviation form to guarantee that they are measuring on the 
same scale and from the same origin, positive correlation among all 
of the 21 dimensions to insure that, to the extent that they are 
measuring the same phenomenon, they are measuring the phenomenon 
in the same direction. In absence of a set of residuals which are all 
simultaneously positively correlated with one another, the 
requirement that the best predictive dimension for the residuals 
must be positively correlated with at least one of the residual 
dimensions must be invoked. The appropriate residual dimensions 
are multiplied by -1 to induce positive correlation between the 
residuals of the first issue dimension and the residuals of the 
remaining 20 issue dimensions, to guarantee that to the extent that 
each of the 21 sets of residuals are measuring the same phenomenon 
as that measured by the residuals of the first issue dimension, they 
are measuring the phenomenon in the same direction. Once positive 
correlation with respect to residuals of dimension 1 has been 
induced, the mean of the 21 residuals is calculated separately for 
each of the 400 congresspeople - this mean becomes one of the 
candidates for the best second predictive dimension. This procedure 
is repeated for each of the 20 remaining residuals; the 21 
dimensions are adjusted (through multiplication of the appropriate 
residuals by - 1) to in turn be positively correlated with the 
residuals of the second through 21st issue dimensions. For positive 
so 
correlation with each of the remaining 20 dimensions, the mean of 
the 21 scores of each of the 400 congresspeople is calculated. After 
these steps have been taken, 21 different sets of means have been 
calculated, one of which must be the best second predictive 
dimension. 
Determining which of these 21 sets of means represents the 
best second dimension requires that the original scores (the scores 
which represent the location of each congressperson on the 
underlying issue space) be regressed on the first predictive 
dimension (the means of the original scores), and on, in turn, each of 
the 21 candidates for the best second predictive dimension (the 21 
sets of means of the adjusted residuals). As with the regressions on 
the first dimension alone, each set of regressions will yield 21 R2 
values. That dimension of the 21 candidates for best second 
dimension is second best which yields the highest average R2 . As 
can be seen in table 2, the best second dimension is found by 
inducing positive correlation with the residuals of the 20th 
dimension of the issue space (the dimension associated with the 
Liberty Lobby). 
As with the single predictive dimension, the average R 2 
resulting from regressions on the first and second predictive 
dimension provides an estimate of the percentage of the issue space 
which may be recovered by efficiently using two predictive 
dimensions. 
Table 2: The results of the regressions performed to determine the best second dimension. 
note that the average R2 resulting from inducing positive correlation with the 
20th issue dimension is the largest. 
Regression 
Dim.: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 20 21 
1 84 .9 76. 4 84.9 85.0 83 .6 85.5 82.4 81 .6 79 .9 81 .8 79.9 79 . 1 78.9 77 .5 82 .0 85.5 80.5 83.4 78 .5 84.9 78.5 
2 38 .3 52 .2 38 .3 38.5 39 .5 38 .2 43 .3 44 .2 45.4 44 .2 45.1 45 .9 42.0 48. 6 44.4 38.2 45 .2 40 .8 47 .2 40 .5 45.1 
3 97 .4 96.4 97.4 97.5 97 .4 97 .2 97 .3 97.4 97.3 97.0 92.1 96 .4 96 .5 96 .5 97 .4 97 .4 97.2 97 .1 96 .9 97.6 97 .0 
4 96 .0 96. 4 96 .0 96.3 96 .0 96 .2 95 .7 95.7 95 .5 95.9 95 .6 95 .3 94 .9 95.3 95.7 96.2 95.7 96. 1 95 .2 96.0 94 .9 
5 72 .8 69.6 72 .8 72 .7 81 . 1 74 .9 70 .1 69 .6 69 .3 67.4 67.3 67 .5 71 .0 71 .4 70 .7 74 .8 67 .3 72 .6 68 .2 73.6 67 .2 
6 82.6 79 .2 82 .6 83 .2 85 .5 84.6 80.4 79 .6 79.4 80.4 78.5 79 . 1 80 .0 80 .8 79 .9 84.0 78 .7 83 .8 77.6 82.1 78.9 
7 83.7 70 .6 83.7 81.4 68 .6 78 .6 88.0 85 .8 80 .6 84.4 80 .2 80 .9 60.0 63.6 84.4 79.6 83 .5 80 .0 74.3 85 .0 72.7 
8 83.8 79 .5 83 .8 83.0 71 .7 79 .0 88 .6 89 .7 87 .8 84.9 88.0 82 .7 71 .7 74.6 89 . 1 80.3 88 .7 77. 5 82 .4 85 .0 81.9 
9 89 . 1 90.4 89 .1 89.0 86 .8 88 . 1 89 .6 90.2 9 1 .3 88.7 90.6 88.4 88 .9 89 .7 90 .2 87.1 90.0 86.7 90. 1 88.8 90 .6 
10 90 .3 89 .6 90.3 90.4 88 .6 90. 7 90 .3 89.9 89.9 91 .2 90.2 91 .3 88.8 89 .1 90 .0 90 .4 90 .2 90 .2 89.9 89.9 88 .6 
11 95 .3 95 .8 95.3 95 .2 95 .3 95.1 95.6 95 .7 96.0 95 .5 96.1 95.7 95.8 96.0 95 .7 95 .2 95 .8 95.0 95.9 95 .3 96 .0 
12 92 .8 94 . 1 92 .8 92 .8 92 .4 92.6 93 .4 93.2 93 . 1 94.0 93.4 95.5 92 . 1 93.8 92 .9 92 .5 93 .4 92.8 93.5 92.3 92.2 
13 73 . 1 77 .5 73.1 73.0 75 .0 74 .3 73 .1 75 .3 76 .8 73 .0 76 .3 73.4 85.7 77 .7 75 .2 73.7 75 .7 75 .1 79 .0 73.0 80.4 
14 64.3 77 .0 64 .3 64.9 75 . 4 68 .0 63.2 63.9 65 .3 63 . 1 66.6 63.6 80 .9 81 .5 63 .6 66 .2 65 .3 70 .0 69.0 64.8 72 .1 
15 88 .8 85 .3 88 .8 87 .3 83.7 87 .3 91.1 90 .7 90.7 88.3 89 .5 87 .3 81.9 83.6 91.6 87.9 89 .4 85.2 84.4 89.7 87 . 1 
1 6 88.8 85.3 88 .3 87 .9 87 .8 88 .5 87 .6 87 .1 85 .4 87.4 86 .6 86.6 86 .6 85 .8 87 .2 89.2 86.8 88.2 85 .3 88.0 86.3 
1 7 88 .3 90.0 90 .5 90 .7 87.0 89 .6 90 .8 90 .9 90 .5 91.3 91.3 90.8 87 .6 88 .6 90.4 89.3 91 .3 89.3 91 .2 89.9 89 .9 
18 90 .5 89 . 1 90.5 90 . 7 90. 7 90.4 90.2 89.9 88 .9 90 .7 88.9 90 . 1 89.8 89.3 89 .7 90 .5 90.0 91.8 89 .8 90 .6 88 .8 
19 91.2 92 .2 91 .2 91 .3 91 . 1 90 .8 91 .4 91.4 91 .3 91 .8 91.5 91 .8 91.2 91 .5 90.8 90 .8 91 .7 91 .2 92 .5 91. 1 91 .5 
20 52 .8 19 .5 52 .8 5 1 .4 44 .1 48 .2 48.4 45.6 36.7 42.9 36 .9 23.5 23 .5 25.3 43 .9 50 .8 40 .3 50 .6 31.3 57.4 26 .6 
2 1 64.8 75 . 1 64.8 63.8 64.3 63 .6 67.4 70.5 72.6 63.9 72 .8 63.5 78 .8 74.0 70 .9 63.9 71.1 64 .9 72 .6 65.2 82 .2 
MEAN81.481.4 76.4 80 .3 80.3 81.0 8 1 .8 8 1 .8 81 .1 80 .8 8 1 . 1 79 .4 76 .5 79.7 81 .7 81.1 81.3 81.1 80 .2 82.0 80.4 
c.n ...... 
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The Third through Thirteenth Predictive Dimensions 
The procedure for calculating the third and higher predictive 
dimensions was identical to the technique used to calculate the 
second predictive dimension. First, the residuals from the 
regressions on all existing predictive dimensions are preserved, and 
placed in deviation form. Then, the residuals for the appropriate 
issue dimensions are multiplied by minus one in order to induce 
positive correlation with the residuals of the first issue dimension, 
and the average for each congressperson of the 21 residuals is 
calculated. Then a regression is run on each of the 21 issue 
dimensions as a function of all previously calculated predictive 
dimensions and the newly calculated means, and the R2 values for 
each of the 21 regressions is preserved, and the average R2 value is 
calculated. The entire process is repeated with positive correlation 
induced with respect to residuals of the second issue dimension, 
then the third, and so on for all 21 issue dimensions. The result will 
be 21 "average R2" values, one associated with the residuals of each 
issue dimension. The average R2 values are then compared, and the 
mean of residuals which provided the highest average R2 value will 
be preserved as the best third dimension. The entire process will 
be repeated using the residuals from regressions on the first three 
dimensions to calculate the best fourth dimension, the residuals 
from regressions of the best four dimensions to calculate the best 
fifth dimension, and so on. The results for the first thirteen 
dimensions are summarized in table 3. 
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Table 3: The R2 values for each of the issue dimensions based 
upon the 1-13 predictive dimension. the numbers in 
italics are the issue dimensions with which the 
residuals were positively correlated from that 
predictive dimension . 
# of Predictive 
Dimensions: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 
Issue 
Dim.:1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1 0 
1 1 
1 2 
1 3 
1 4 
1 5 
1 6 
1 7 
1 8 
1 9 
20 
76.4 84.9 86.0 86.2 87 .2 87.4 88.2 88. 7 89.4 90 .5 97. 1 98.2 98 .4 
38 .140.859.385.487 .0 88.188.494 .896.596.8 97.297.398.2 
96.497.697 .697.897 .9 97.998.498.498.598.6 98.698.798.8 
94.9 96.0 96 .5 96.7 96.9 97 .4 97.8 98.0 98.0 98.6 98.6 98.6 98.6 
67.2 73.6 74.8 75.5 75.5 87.689.3 90.3 91 .3 91 .7 92 . 7 94.9 95 .9 
77.582 .184 . 184.288.1 88 .689.690.790 .997.7 97.898 .098.2 
60.085.089.489.490.8 91.192.393.293.294.1 95.495 .596.4 
68.4 85 .0 91 .6 92.4 93.1 94.0 94.8 95.2 95.2 95.3 95.4 96.6 96.6 
86.688.889.791.191.5 91 .591 .892 .592 .993.0 93.794 .097.8 
88.6 89.9 89.9 90.0 91 .0 91 . 9 93.4 93.8 94.6 94.6 95 .0 95.0 95.7 
95.095.396 .396.396.8 96.996.997.197.798.2 98.698 .799.0 
92.192.393.193.593.7 94.495 .696.296.597.1 97.397.798.2 
73 .0 73. 0 77 .0 79. 7 83 .0 84 .8 93. 794.2 94.4 94.4 94. 7 94. 7 95 .8 
63.164.880.784.985.4 91.392.293 .995 .996.0 96 .5 96.597.5 
80.789.794.494.895 .8 96.797.097.497.697.7 97 .898.098 .0 
85 .3 88 .0 88 .3 88.4 88.9 88.9 90.2 90.7 91.2 91.4 91.5 97.397.7 
86.9 89.9 89.9 90.3 90.6 91.2 91.9 93.4 93.5 94 .0 95.0 95.1 95.1 
88 .8 90.6 91.0 92.3 93.0 94.194.294.2 94.3 96.2 96.5 96 .5 96.6 
90 .891.191.191.191 .3 92.192.593.393.493.8 94.894.995.2 
19.157.468.570.486.5 87 .687 .690.298 .698.6 98 .698.799.4 
21 63 .5 65 .279 .082 .185 .7 87.289 .292 .893 .094.4 95.095.595.5 
mean 6 8 . 5 8 2 . O 8 6 . 1 8 8 . 2 9 O . O 9 1 . 5 9 2 . 6 9 3 . 8 9 4 . 6 9 5 . 4 9 6 . 1 9 6 . 7 9 7 . 3 
gain 6 8 . 5 1 3. 5 4. 1 2. 1 1 . 8 1 . 5 1 . 1 1 . 2 O. 8 O. 8 O. 7 O. 6 O. 6 
In the interest of finding some reasonable terminus to this 
exercise, the iterative process of calculating the best third, fourth , 
fifth , etc. dimension was terminated at the best thirteenth 
dimension (the results are summarized in figure 6), as the 
thirteenth dimension marks the point at which every one of the 21 
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issue dimensions are explained with R2 values of 95% or better. In 
fact, no research using the Enelow and Hinich model has posited 
anything on the order of thirteen predictive dimensions, and the 
concept of the average voter using more than thirteen predictive 
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Figure 6: The percentage of the issue space explained by 
various numbers of predictive dimensions. 
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dimensions is sufficiently beyond the pale that one may safely 
assume that all predictive dimensions that might actually be used by 
the voter have been accounted for. The R2 values for each of the 21 
issue dimensions for the first thirteen best predictive dimensions, 
as well as the average R2 for those predictive dimensions, is 
provided in table 3. Of particular interest, as shown in the table, is 
the high degree to which the first few predictive dimensions explain 
the issue space, as well as how quickly the "payoff" ( in terms of 
increase in accuracy in modeling the issue space) of adding a 
predictive dimension drops off. The first dimension describes a 
congresspersons location in issue space with almost 70% accuracy, 
and the first two dimensions explain the issue space with over 80% 
accuracy, yet the next 11 predictive dimensions add less than 1 5% to 
the total accuracy in describing the issue space. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Ideally, one could readily produce a theoretically sound and 
intuitively convincing formula for the voter's utility curve in the 
issue space, as well as a function which reflects the cost of 
accumulating predictive dimensions. Armed with these formulas, 
and using the data concerning the recovery of the issue space which 
is the bulk of this paper, one could calculate precisely how many 
issue dimensions the voters use in making their voting decision. 
Unfortunately, utility and cost functions are not readily available, 
and the series of assumptions which would be needed to derive any 
such functions would most likely be neither compelling nor 
convincing. 
Although no convincing quantitative method can be used to 
calculate the number of issue dimensions that a voter will use in the 
voting decision, the data on recovery of the issue space does suggest 
some interesting possibilities. The utility that any individual voter 
derives from the voting process is going to be absolutely minimal, 
both because the candidates from which the voter has to choose are 
generally very close to each other in the issue space (Black 1 948 a, 
b, Enelow and Hinich 1 984, et al) and because the likelihood of the 
individual voter changing the outcome of the election is negligible. 
Because the voters will perceive very little chance of increasing 
their well being through voting, they will not be willing to go to 
very much effort to determine the candidates location in the issue 
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space. But the first predictive dimension allows the voter to 
determine the candidates' positions on the issue with 68.5% 
accuracy, which seems likely to be as much information as most 
voters would be inclined to need or want (given the minimal utility 
gained by voting). It might well be, then, that elections are best 
modeled by the use of a single predictive dimension, since few if any 
voters would bother to pick up any additional information. 
If this is the case, the bulk of election theory since Black's 
early work of the 1 940's has been unnecessarily complicated, and 
that the many unsatisfying results associated with multiple-
dimension models of elections are not a matter of great concern. As 
Enelow and Hinich (1984) mention, in the case of elections with 
multiple issue dimensions but with only a single predictive 
dimension, the model collapses to a single-dimension model 
essentially identical to that proposed by Black (1948 a, b). If a 
sing le predictive dimension is sufficient to describe voter behavior 
(as the data suggests is possible), and if the voters have quasi-
concave utility function as Black hypothesized (a very reasonable 
assumption), then the desirable characteristics of the black model 
would naturally follow. That is, the median most preferred point 
will have a majority against any other, and a pairwise majority vote 
among the alternatives will actually produce a complete order. 
Of course, the claim that only a single predictive dimension is 
used by the voters, while suggested by the data presented here, is by 
no means proven. To make the assumption of a single predictive 
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dimension would be a very strong assumption indeed. Nonetheless, it 
remains an intriguing possibility. 
Enelow and Hinich (1984) hypothesize and give some empirical 
evidence based on voter surveys, about the nature of the first two 
predictive dimensions. Enelow and Hinich use a model with two 
issue dimensions, which they felt described voter behavior 
sufficiently. The two dimensions that they use are a liberal-
conservative axis, and an axis which they characterize as a 
"libertarian" axis. They site data to support their choice of these 
two axis, but ultimately rely more on intuitive appeal than anything 
else to make their case. 
The data collected here regarding both the best first 
predictive dimension and the best second predictive dimension 
suggests that the dimensions identified and used by Enelow and 
Hinich in their two predictive dimension model are, in fact, 
precisely the two predictive dimensions that voters would use, 
assuming that voters used exactly two dimensions (an assumption, 
as discussed above, which might not be correct) . 
First, consider the best first predictive dimension, as 
uncovered in this paper. It goes a very long way in describing the 
issue dimensions provided by Americans for Democratic Action and 
the American Civil Liberties Union, both of which would generally be 
described as liberal organizations, and in describing the dimensions 
provided by the American Conservative Union and Christian Voice, 
both of which would be described as basically conservative 
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organizations. Because the first predictive dimension describes 
these liberal and conservative issue dimensions so well, it strongly 
suggests that the first predictive dimension is the liberal-
conservative predictive dimension sited by Enelow and Hinich, as 
well as many other researchers. 
The best second predictive dimension found in this study was 
positively correlated with the issue dimension of the Liberty Lobby, 
and best describes the Liberty Lobby's dimension. Because this best 
second predictive dimension so clearly reflects the issue dimension 
defined by a Libertarian Lobby, it seems clear that the second 
dimension measures the degree of libertarian tendency of 
congresspeople. The correlation of the best two issue dimensions 
deduced in this paper with the two issue dimensions hypothesized by 
Enelow and Hinich provides some evidence that both are correct. 
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APPENDIX 
To more fully explore the steps involved in this analysis, consider 
a more condensed set of data, with ten congresspeople, each having 
scores (between O and 100) for five dimensions in the underlying issue 
space. the score for congresspeople A-J on the issue dimensions V-Z 
are: 
v w x y z 
A 20 65 50 33 30 
B 0 50 36 17 30 
c 20 75 29 75 30 
D 0 10 36 58 40 
E 10 40 29 92 60 
F 0 40 17 92 30 
G 20 65 8 67 70 
H 60 90 71 67 50 
0 40 0 93 50 
J 74 80 100 20 40 
Step 1: Alter each score to deviation form by expressing each in terms 
of standard deviations from the mean of the relevant issue dimension. 
For example, the adjusted score for candidate A on issue V (designated 
V Aa) is given by VAa = (VA - mean V) I StDev V. This step guarantees 
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that the various dimensions vary from the same mean (O), and to the 
same scale (standard deviations from the mean). 
v w x y z 
A -0.01522 0.39627 0.41512 -0.97587 -1.03712 
B -0.77634 -0 .22942 -0.05356 -1 .52566 -1.03712 
c -0.01522 0.81340 -0 .28791 0.46732 -0.29632 
D -0.77634 -1.89794 -0.05356 -0.11683 -0.29632 
E -0.39578 -0.64655 -0.28791 1.05147 1.18528 
F -0.77634 -0.64655 -0 .68964 1.05147 -1.03712 
G -0.01522 0.39627 -0.99093 0.19243 1.92607 
H 1.50701 1.43910 1.11815 0.19243 0.44448 
-0.77634 0.64655 -1.25875 1.08583 0.44448 
J 2.03979 1.02197 2.08899 -1.42258 -0.29632 
The objective of finding the first best predictive dimension - the 
single score for each congressperson which best describes the issue 
dimensions, will utilize two characteristics that must be present in 
the predictive dimension that best describes the data. First, it must be 
the case that the best predictive dimension be positively correlated 
with at least one issue dimension. Second, the predictive dimension 
will necessarily be an average of the scores of the candidates on the 
issue dimensions, since by ordinary least squares the mean of a set of 
numbers is the best single number estimate of that set. The goal now 
becomes checking all scores which fit these criterion. 
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Step 2: Check the correlation coefficients of the issue dimensions. 
w 
x 
y 
z 
v 
0 .793 
0.852 
-0.379 
0.120 
w 
0.538 
-0.289 
0 .096 
x y 
-0.644 
-0.277 0.445 
Step 3: Multiply the scores of issue dimensions which are negatively 
correlated with the first issue dimension by -1 , so that the adjusted 
scores will all be positively correlated with the first issue dimension. 
In this case, multiply the scores on issue dimension Y by -1, so that all 
dimensions are positively correlated with issue dimension V. This is 
done to guarantee that, to the extent that the various dimensions vary 
with issue dimension V, they vary in the same direction as dimension V. 
v 
A -0.01 522 
B -0.77634 
c -0. 01522 
D -0.77634 
E -0.39578 
F -0.77634 
G -0.01 522 
H 1 .50701 
-0.77634 
J 2 .03979 
v 
w 0.793 
x 
y 
z 
0.852 
0.379 
0.120 
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w 
0.39627 
-0.22942 
0.81340 
-1.89794 
-0 .64655 
-0.64655 
0.39627 
1.43910 
0 .64655 
1.02197 
w 
0.538 
0.289 
0.096 
x 
0.41512 
-0.05356 
-0.28791 
-0.05356 
-0.28791 
-0.68964 
-0.99093 
1.11815 
-1 .25875 
2.08899 
x 
0.644 
-0.277 
y z 
0 .97587 -1.03712 
1.52566 -1.03712 
-0.46732 -0.29632 
0. 11683 -0.29632 
-1 .05147 1. 18528 
-1.05147 -1.03712 
-0. 1 9243 1 .92607 
-0.1 9243 0.44448 
-1 .08583 0.44448 
1 .42258 -0.29632 
y 
-0.445 
Step 4: For each of the ten congresspeople, calculate the average of the 
five adjusted issue dimensions. These numbers will be positively 
correlated with issue dimension V, and so are a candidate for the best 
first predictive dimension. 
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A 0.14699 F -0.84022 
B -0.1141 6 G 0.22475 
c -0 .05067 H 0.86326 
D -0.58147 -0.66460 
E -0.23929 J 1.25540 
Step 5: Regress each of the adjusted issue dimensions X-Z on the 
means calculated above, preserving the R2 values and the residuals for 
each of the five regressions involved. To compare the various potential 
predictive dimensions, the regression of each potential predictive 
dimension on the issue dimensions will be used to determine how much 
of the variation in the various issue dimensions is captured by the 
variation in the potential predictive dimension. 
v 90.1 w 67.2 x 69.2 y 31.7 z 2.2 
Step 6: Calculate the average of the R2 values of the first set of 
regressions. in this example, the average for the R2 values is 52.08. 
This score tells us what percentage of the variation of the candidates' 
positions in the issue space is captured by the potential predictive 
dimension. 
Step 7-11: Repeat steps 2-5 for the second the issue dimension. In 
this case, when all of the scores are positively correlated with V, all 
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are also positively correlated with issue dimension W, so the results 
shown in step 6 are the same as will result in step 11 . 
Step 12: Repeat Step 2. 
v 
w 0.793 
x 
y 
z 
0.852 
0.379 
0.120 
w 
0.538 
0.289 
0.096 
x 
0.644 
-0.277 
y 
-0.445 
Step 1 3: Multiply the scores of issue dimensions which are negatively 
correlated with the third issue dimension by -1, so that the adjusted 
scores will all be positively correlated with the third issue dimension. 
In this case, multiply the scores on issue dimension Z by -1 , so that all 
dimensions are positively correlated with issue dimension X. 
v 
-0.01522 0.39627 
B -0.77634 
c -0.01522 
D -0.77634 
E -0.39578 
F -0.77634 
G -0.01 522 
H 1.50701 
-0.77634 
J 2.03979 
v 
w 0 .793 
x 
y 
z 
0.852 
0.379 
-0. 1 20 
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w 
0.41512 
-0.22942 
0.81340 
-1 .89794 
-0.64655 
-0 .64655 
0.39627 
1.43910 
0.64655 
1.02197 
w 
0.538 
0.289 
-0.096 
x 
0.97587 
-0.05356 
-0.28791 
-0.05356 
-0.28791 
-0.68964 
-0 .99093 
1.11815 
-1.2587 5 
2.08899 
x 
0.644 
0.277 
y z A 
1.03712 
1.52566 1.03712 
-0.46732 0 .29632 
0.11683 0.29632 
-1.05147 -1.18528 
-1 .05147 1.03712 
-0.1 9243 -1 .92607 
-0.1 9243 -0.44448 
-1.08583 -0.44448 
1 .42258 0.29632 
y 
0.445 
Step 14: For each of the ten congresspeople, calculate the average of 
the five adjusted issue dimensions. 
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A 0 .56183 F 
B 0 .30069 G 
C 0.06785 H 
D -0.46294 
E -0 .71340 J 
-0.42538 
-0.54568 
0.68547 
-0 .84239 
1.37393 
Step 1 5: Regress each of the issue dimensions X-Z on the means 
calculated above, preserving the R2 values and the residuals for each of 
the five regressions involved. 
v 64.9 w 49.0 x 84.3 y 58.4 z 17.4 
Step 16: Calculate the average of the R2 values of the set of 
regressions. in this example, the average for the R2 values is 54.8. 
Step 17-21 : Repeat steps 12-16 for the fourth issue dimension. In 
this case, when all of the scores are positively correlated with X, all 
are also positively correlated with issue dimension Y, so the results 
shown in step 16 are the same as will result in step 21 . 
Step 22: Repeat Step 2. 
v 
w 0.793 
x 
y 
z 
0.852 
0.379 
-0.120 
w 
0.538 
0.289 
-0 .096 
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x 
0.644 
0.277 
y 
0.445 
Step 23: Multiply the scores of issue dimensions which are negatively 
correlated with the fifth issue dimension by -1, so that the adjusted 
scores will all be positively correlated with the fifth issue dimension. 
In this case, multiply the scores on issue dimensions V and W by -1 , so 
that all dimensions are positively correlated with issue dimension Z. 
v w x y z 
A 0.01522 -0.39627 0.41512 0.97587 1.03712 
B 0.77634 0.22942 -0.05356 1.52566 1.03712 
c 0.01522 -0.81340 -0.28791 -0.46732 0.29632 
D 0.77634 1.89794 -0.05356 0.11683 0.29632 
E 0.39578 0.64655 -0.28791 -1.05147 -1. 18528 
F 0.77634 0.64655 -0.68964 -1.05147 1.03712 
G 0.01522 -0.39627 -0.99093 -0.19243 -1.92607 
H -1.50701 -1.43910 1.11815 -0.19243 -0.44448 
0.77634 -0.64655 -1.25875 -1.08583 -0.44448 
J -2.03979 -1.02197 2.08899 1.42258 0.29632 
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v w x y 
w -0. 793 
x -0.852 -0.538 
y -0.379 -0.289 0.644 
z 0.120 0.096 0.277 0.445 
Step 24: For each of the ten congresspeople, calculate the average of 
the five adjusted issue dimensions. 
A -0.409412 F -0.143780 
B -0. 702995 G 0.698097 
C 0.251417 H 0.492973 
D -0.606773 0.273234 
E 0.296464 J -0.149226 
Step 2 5: Regress each of the issue dimensions X-Z on the means 
calculated above, preserving the R2 values and the residuals for each of 
the five regressions involved. 
v 8.3 w 20.0 x 5.0 y 35.9 z 66.7 
Step 26: Calculate the average of the R2 values of the set of 
regressions. in this example, the average for the R2 values is 27.2. 
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(Repeat the procedure described above until the same treatment 
has been done for each of the issue dimensions being explored. In this 
case, all five issue dimensions have been treated, though in the study 
described in the main text, another 1 6 dimensions would remain to be 
described.) 
Step 27: Compare the average R2 values calculated in the previous 
steps, and preserve the residual values for the set of regressions which 
provided the highest average R2 values. This set of regressions is the 
best first predictive dimension. The residuals from the other sets of 
regressions may be deleted. In the example the average R2 value 
resulting from the regression based on the X (and Y) issue dimension 
was the greatest, and left the following residuals: 
v w x y z 
A -0.64272 -0. 14910 -0.30026 0.38029 0.71180 
B - 1.11218 -0.52130 -0.43643 1 .20691 0.86301 
c -0.09101 0.74754 -0.37431 -0.53925 0.25703 
D -0.25929 -1 .44856 0.53590 0.60758 0.56437 
E 0.40100 0.04595 0.62046 -0.29522 -0.77220 
F -0.30124 -0.23363 -0. 14800 -0.60054 1 .28342 
G 0.59423 0.92597 -0.29611 0.38603 -1.61011 
H 0.74142 0.77370 0.24534 -0.91907 -0.84139 
0.16451 0.1711 7 -0.18614 -0. 19284 0.04329 
J 0.50527 -0.31172 0.33957 -0.03389 -0.49923 
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Step 28: Alter each of these scores to deviation form by expressing 
each in terms of standard deviations from the mean of the relevant 
issue dimension. This guarantees that the residual scores will measure 
from the same mean (O) and to the same scale (standard deviations 
from the mean). In the example, the results of this procedure are: 
v w x y z 
A -0.01 522 0.39627 0.41 512 0.97587 1.03712 
B -0.77634 -0.22942 -0.05356 1 .52566 1.03712 
c -0.01 522 0.81340 -0.28791 -0.46732 0.29632 
D -0.77634 -1 .89794 -0.05356 0. 11683 0.29632 
E -0.39578 -0.64655 -0.28791 -1 .05147 -1.18528 
F -0 .77634 -0.39627 -0.68964 -1 .05147 1.03712 
G -0.01522 0.39627 -0.99093 -0. 1 9243 -1 .92607 
H 1 .50701 1.43910 1.11815 -0. 19243 -0.44448 
-0.77634 -0.64655 -1 .25875 -1 .08583 -0.44448 
J 2.03979 1 .02197 2.08899 1.42258 0.29632 
To determine the second predictive dimension, use the adjusted 
residual scores above and repeat the procedure used to determine the 
first predictive dimension, regressing each issue dimension on the 
first best predictive dimension and the potential second best 
predictive dimension. The third best predictive dimension is 
determined in the same way, and so on. 
